Weathering El Niño: Where the Market Risks Are Building
By Stephen Innes
Published 08/17/2026, 02:33 AM
From sugar and cocoa to copper and credit, El Niño could create divergent risks across commodities, regions and asset classes.
Takeaways by Morgan Stanley
Weathering El Niño
El Niño – a weather phenomenon that has caused as much as $84 trillion in global economic damage since 2000 – is shaping up for a potentially devastating season. As a new El Niño gains strength, local governments are watching for potential effects on their communities. Investors are paying attention too, as weather patterns associated with El Niño could affect commodity production, markets and economies.
It is one of the few climate events with a truly global reach. In North America, El Niño typically brings milder winters to the northern U.S. and stormier conditions to the southern states and Gulf of Mexico. South America generally experiences heavier rainfall, while Indonesia, Australia and southern Asia could face droughts.
The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which forecasts weather and monitors the global climate, sees an 81% chance of this year’s El Niño becoming a very strong event.
“Most El Niño years are a nuisance, but this one has the makings of a shock, and as weather patterns shift across key growing regions, the effects may extend far beyond local forecasts and into supply chains, prices and investment returns,” says Julia Rizzo, Morgan Stanley Research Equity Analyst and Commodities Strategist for Latin America.
Uneven Impacts for Agriculture
NOAA’s models indicate that El Niño conditions are expected to peak from December through February, coinciding with the main planting and crop-development period in South America.
Wetter conditions could benefit agricultural yields in Argentina and southern Brazil, while other regions of Brazil face a greater risk of irregular rainfall and delayed soybeanplanting.
“As a result, a super-bullish grain price scenario appears less likely, especially considering that El Niño events have historically coincided with weaker grain prices,” Rizzo says.
Morgan Stanley Research finds that sugar is the agricultural commodity most likely to get a price boost from El Niño. Weaker monsoon rainfall could cut sugar-cane production in India, Thailand and Southeast Asia, while heavier rainfall in Brazil could reduce yields there.
West Africa grows most of the world’s cocoa, chocolate’s main ingredient, and output there could suffer too — first from wet-season disease between June and October, then from the dry, dusty Harmattan winds.
“El Niño is more relevant as a regional earnings and positioning question than as a broad directional trade,” Rizzo says. “Crop timing, geographic exposure and operating flexibility will determine where weather translates into lower volumes, higher costs or stronger prices.”
El Niño’s Long Tail
Historically, El Niño has had little bearing on global asset prices, with some exceptions in commodity markets. But a “super” event—depending on its timing and duration—could break that pattern. Lower agricultural output could add to inflationary pressures, with potential consequences for economies and financial markets.
“We expect copper and emerging-market sovereign credits to be the most structurally exposed to a ‘super’ event,” says Morgan Stanley Research Cross-Asset Strategist Erika Singh-Cundy. “Given these risks, along with headwinds from energy prices, we maintain our preference for developed-market over emerging-market risk assets.”
Here are Morgan Stanley Research’s views on El Niño’s impact across asset classes:
Metals: Copper output could face disruptions, potentially leading to higher prices. In Chile, the world’s largest copper producer, wetter weather and flooding could pose risks to mining infrastructure. Drought in Zambia, which accounts for 4% of global copper production, could cause hydropower shortages, affecting output.
Credit: In debt markets, El Niño could pose risks to sovereign credit in parts of Latin America and Africa, with impacts varying widely by country: droughts threaten agriculture and hydropower, while heavy rains can damage infrastructure or, in some cases, boost harvests. Higher food prices add lagged inflationary risk. Sovereigns with more fiscal capacity and external buffers should be better insulated. Ecuador, Mozambique, Zambia, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru are likely to be the most exposed, while Chile, Uruguay and Argentina could benefit.
Local rates: Within Latin America, El Niño poses the greatest risk to local rates in Brazil, Colombia and Peru via higher inflationary pressures. While their central banks are likely to look past initial food-price shocks, second-round effects could delay easing cycles or keep rates restrictive for longer.
FX: Latin American currencies could experience more volatility. Higher inflation and interest rates would support local currencies, but weaker growth and uncertainty about the inflation outlook could weigh on them.
Equities: The impact of El Niño is likely to vary by sector. Higher soft-commodity prices would benefit sugar producers and agricultural-input suppliers—including companies providing seeds, fertilizers, chemicals and equipment—as well as the Latin American power sector and scaled U.S. food retailers and discounters. However, companies that buy higher-priced crops, including Brazilian chicken and protein producers, could face pressure.
https://uk.investing.com/analysis/weathering-el-nino-where-the-market-risks-are-building-200627261
KEY POINTS
BEIJING, CHINA - 2026/07/18: Shoppers stroll along a landscaped path near the POLÈNE luxury goods store in Sanlitun, carrying bags and enjoying the bustling scene.
China's economy lost momentum across the board in July, as consumer spending stalled and urban investment contracted at a faster pace while unemployment ticked higher, adding to pressure on Beijing to step up support in the second half.
Retail sales eked out a 0.6% growth from a year earlier, according to the National Bureau of Statistics on Monday, missing the estimated 1.5% jump in a Reuters poll, and slowing from the 1% growth in June.
China's urban fixed-asset investment, including real estate and infrastructure, contracted 6.7% this year as of end-July from a year earlier, worse than the estimated 6% decline in the poll. The decline also steepened from the 5.7% drop in the first half of this year.
Industrial output rose 4.5% in July, undershooting the estimated 4.8% growth and slowing from 5.3% rise in June.
The urban unemployment rate stood at 5.2% in July, ticking up from 5% in June.
The data, which was released at 3 p.m. instead of the usual 10 a.m., reinforced concerns about the health of the world's second-largest economy that has grappled with a deepening supply-demand imbalance.
Industrial production and exports tied to the global AI investment boom have helped cushion weak consumption and private investment, but July data suggest that support may be thinning.
China must "accelerate the transition to new growth drivers," the statistics bureau said in the English statement, while calling for greater reforms and opening up further.
During the Monday presser, statistics bureau spokesperson Fu Linghui said that geopolitical pressure abroad and high temperatures domestically impacted China's economy last month. While acknowledging that key economic metrics softened last month, Fu pointed to 5% growth in services retail sales over the first seven months of the year, versus 1.1% jump in retail sales of goods.
Exports, new growth drivers and macro policy would support China's economy in achieving the full-year growth target, despite "shocks" from extreme weather in July, Fu added.
https://www.cnbc.com/2026/08/17/china-economy-sales-investment-july-.html
The critical issue in any U.S. attempts to enforce against transshipment are the definitions and scope. As Peter Navarro's report accurately states, "Effective enforcement […] requires distinguishing legitimate manufacturing and substantial transformation from pass-through trade and origin shifting." (The Great Transshipment Scam) Given the extensive and diverse global supply chains in today's manufacturing, establishing reasonable criteria for enforcing rules against "transshipment" without sanctioning "legitimate manufacturing" will be a significant challenge. For example, a rule that seems reasonable for assembly of electronic products in Mexico or India is likely to be quite different from one applicable to garments.
The concept of transshipment is far from new. For decades under U.S. unfair trade laws, interested domestic parties could bring a "circumvention" action when goods effectively originating in a country subject to an outstanding antidumping or countervailing order were routed goods through third countries. (Such laws may be used by the administration as a legal basis for its transshipment efforts.) (Legal Basis) The Trump Administration also proposed an anti-circumvention rule in July 2025, which apparently was never implemented.
Circumvention occurs where there is minimal local value added in the third country. (19 U.S.C. § 1677) A recent (2023) example related to solar panels originating in China. Soon after the U.S. AD/CVD orders against China were published, shipments of solar panels from Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia to the United States greatly increased in volume. The U.S. domestic solar panel industry filed an anti-circumvention action. Ultimately, the Department of Commerce concluded, because of the low valued added in the intermediate countries and the heavy dependence on Chinese-source components, that the orders were being circumvented. With several delays not relevant here the solar panels from Vietnam and the other three countries were made subject to the tariff rates that would have been applied if the panels had been shipped directly from China. (Final Scope Determination)
The Navarro transshipment tariffs, if applied, differ from past circumvention actions in two critical ways. First, their application would not be limited to goods subject to an outstanding U.S. antidumping, countervailing duty or other order. Secondly, instead of limiting the actions to specific goods from a given country or countries, the anti-transshipment actions could apply to more than 40 countries, not only low labor cost nations such as Mexico, India, Turkey and Vietnam, but to the EU, Canada, Israel, South Korea and Japan. Thus, while the administration’s primary concern is over Chinese efforts to evade U.S. tariffs as the primary instigator of transshipment for duty evasion, the threatened new chapter in America's trade war with the world would cut a much wider swath.
Implementing a broad transshipment policy could be difficult politically as well as legally. The likelihood of broader retaliation against higher tariffs from former friends and allies (particularly the EU and Canada) beyond current very limited levels exists. Although China as the transshipment initiator rather than one of the intermediate countries is not a direct target, the economic interests of the Chinese government and hundreds of Chinese enterprises could be directly harmed. Under such circumstances it would be naive to assume that China would not retaliate with its own pressure points such as restrictions on rare earth minerals, reduction of agricultural purchases from the United States agribusiness, and import restrictions.
Other downsides are obvious. The restrictions would inevitably be inflationary, raising both finished product and supply chain costs for both U.S. businesses and consumers. The administrative burdens, including new record-keeping, would be substantial, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises and on Customs and Border Protection, even once the new AI-enabled “Detective Border” mechanism proposed under the White House report were perfected. Some important products could at least temporarily be unavailable in the United States. The uncertainties created as of August 14 as to how the Navarro proposals will be implemented in the real world of exports and imports will add further to those created since April 2025, continuing their chilling impact on new investment and hiring both in the U.S. and elsewhere.
Future tariff treatment of goods traded under the USMCA is also in question. Despite 25%-50% tariffs on aluminum, steel, copper, their derivative goods as well as up to 25% on autos and auto parts, 80%-85% of Mexican and Canadian goods meeting USMCA rules of origin currently enter the U.S. duty free.(U.S. Tariff rates) (This may change August 19 if Mr. Trump proceeds with his threat to impose 50% tariffs on about $20 billion worth of USMCA-compliant products entering from Canada.) (New Tariffs on Canada) Given the number of Mexican exports to the U.S. that rely on some parts and components from outside North America that still meet USMCA rules of origin, there is no guarantee that such goods will continue to enter duty free, even if legally eligible to do. The same applies to goods imported from Canada and under the United States-Korea FTA and other U.S. FTAs with more than a dozen other countries. (U.S. FTAs)
None of these comments should be interpreted as advocating against reasonable, well-targeted new rules against transshipment. Transshipment has been a recurring problem with China not only in solar panels but for the United States and many other countries with steel, autos and other commodities such as some consumer electronic devices, clothing, and textiles. The departure by the Trump administration from U.S. most-favored nation tariffs averaging around 3% and FTA tariffs normally set at zero in favor of widely differing tariff rates applicable almost on a country-by-country basis seem likely in my view to have exacerbated the urgency for enterprises to seek lower tariff rates, and not only by China. Estimates of annual U.S. tariff losses according to Dr. Navarro’s data range from $18 billion to $136 billion.
However, it can be argued that the U.S. administration should follow a more focused approach, prioritizing goods that have national security implications and/or could realistically be produced in the United States. It would be sensible to negotiate initially with a few suspected major transshipping destinations, such as Vietnam, India, and Mexico. It is difficult to see how Dr. Navarro's anticipated broad-brush approach will work out well for the United States and major trading partners. As Dr. Navarro well understands, transshipping is a problem primarily created by China, with an assist from the U.S. administration’s tariff policies (including but not limited to the widely varying levels applicable to China) and pressures from both Trump and Biden administrations to delink production destined for the United States from China.. Unfortunately, for legitimate economic, political, and national security reasons the United States cannot hold China accountable for fear of risking damaging retaliation, as noted earlier.
Finally, as the paper is authored by Dr. Navarro, probably the administration's most doctrinaire protectionist, it will be surprising to some observers if the applicable rules are designed to address legitimate transshipping concerns rather than as another (probably futile) attempt to reduce the U.S. trade deficit, generate high volumes of tariff revenue, or encourage U.S. manufacturing and job creation. Rather, the policy is as much or more likely to increase costs of imports for many if not most American importers and consumers. Unfortunately, expanding Mr. Trump's tariff war with the rest of the world may well be considered by some to be an additional fringe benefit in itself, as will be the rush by well-connected foreign producers and importers to obtain exceptions.
According to pricing firm Argus, freight rates have risen sharply on many key routes, from the Red Sea and Black Sea to the Panama Canal and the Rhine River in Europe. In the container market, the average spot freight rate from the Far East to the East Coast of the United States increased 234% year-on-year, reaching $10,249 per 40-foot (approximately 12.2m) container.
Ships navigate through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a strategic shipping lane connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. Photo: Reuters
Conflicts in the Middle East continue to disrupt vital energy shipping routes. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which previously carried about one-fifth of the world 's oil and gas from the Gulf, has virtually come to a standstill, forcing ships to reroute and seek alternative energy sources.
Not only is shipping through the Strait of Hormuz under pressure, but other shipping routes are also being affected by the conflict. In the Red Sea, the risk of attacks on Saudi-linked oil tankers passing through the Bab al-Mandab Strait has driven oil freight rates from the Gulf to Asia up to $15.22 per barrel on August 10th, the highest level since Argus began tracking it in 2005. In the Black Sea, freight rates for oil tankers bound for the Mediterranean have also reached their highest levels since at least 2005.
Meanwhile, extreme weather is adding pressure to other shipping routes. Lower water levels in the Panama Canal due to El Niño, coupled with increased shipping traffic, have driven the cost of securing passage to record levels. In early August, prices at the two lock systems reached $1.1 million and $2.5 million, respectively.
In Europe, a prolonged drought has caused water levels in the Rhine River, a vital shipping route for Germany's heavy industry, to plummet. Barge freight rates on this river have risen to their highest levels since 2012.
However, conflict and extreme weather aren't the only factors driving up shipping costs. Port congestion and strong shipping demand are also putting pressure on global logistics networks. Maersk CEO Vincent Clerc said wait times at Shanghai ports have reached 12 days, as infrastructure in China , Northern Europe, South America, and West Africa is strained by increased cargo volumes.
According to Clerc, congestion and bottlenecks in the transport network, rather than the Middle East conflict alone, are the main drivers pushing up container freight rates. Global container demand in the second quarter also exceeded forecasts, with Chinese exports being the main growth driver.
The current level of disruption is considered particularly severe by experts. John Ollett, head of European freight pricing at Argus, stated that this is "the biggest disruption the shipping market has ever seen," surpassing even the disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and the impact of sanctions against Russia.
https://www.vietnam.vn/en/gia-cuoc-van-tai-tang-ky-luc-tai-nhieu-tuyen-hang-hai
A consortium of energy companies is moving forward with a massive new gas pipeline in Texas. The Solitude Pipeline System is a joint venture (JV) between privately held energy infrastructure developer WhiteWater, oil and gas producers Diamondback Energy (NASDAQ:FANG) and Devon Energy (NYSE:DVN), and midstream companies MPLX (NYSE:MPLX) and Western Midstream Partners (NYSE:WES). The two-phased pipeline system should start operations in late 2029.
Here's a look at the new pipeline project and how it will fuel years of growth for those four energy stocks.
Image source: Getty Images.
Introducing the Solitude Pipeline System
WhiteWater and its JV partners recently announced that they reached a Final Investment Decision to build two new natural gas pipelines from the Permian Basin to Katy, Texas. The Solitude Pipeline System will have an initial capacity of around 2.25 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) when the first phase enters commercial service in late 2029. The partners plan to bring the second phase online in 2030, adding another 2.25 Bcf/d of capacity. The JV can further expand the system to meet shipper demand. They've already secured substantial long-term firm transportation agreements with investment-grade shippers to back the large-scale pipeline system.
WhiteWater will own 50% of the JV, Devon 25%, MPLX 10%, and Diamondback Energy and Western Midstream Partners 7.5% each. The pipeline system will enable oil and gas producers to deliver more gas from the Permian Basin to demand centers along the U.S. Gulf Coast, including liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminals.
Helping unlock the value of Permian gas
The pipeline will help oil and gas producers like Devon Energy and Diamondback Energy to unlock the value of their associated gas production in the Permian. Devon Energy highlighted in a press release announcing its participation in the project that "Permian producers have long absorbed volatile and periodically negative pricing at the Waha hub, where takeaway capacity has repeatedly failed to keep pace with associated gas growth." The company noted that firm, long-haul capacity to the Gulf Coast changes the equation for producers, enabling them to get more gas out of the region and into markets where they can sell it at higher prices. Solitude is just one aspect of Devon's strategy to unlock value. It was also a founding equity owner of Matterhorn Express (which it sold last year) and secured shipping capacity to support two other large-scale gas pipeline projects (Blackcomb and Eiger). These initiatives will enable it to continue to profitably grow its production in the region.
https://finance.yahoo.com/energy/articles/pipeline-could-unlock-years-growth-161501411.html
China is estimated to have added about 200,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil to its huge inventories in July as imports rebounded from a decade-low in June and refinery runs remained depressed.
The world’s top crude oil importer, unlike other major oil consumers, started drawing down on stockpiles only in May, the third month of the Middle East crisis, as it had amassed an estimated 1.4 billion barrels of crude oil in commercial and strategic stocks at the start of the Iran war.
The trend of drawdowns in May and June appears to have reversed in July, according to calculations by Reuters columnist Clyde Russell based on officially available Chinese data.
Unlike the United States, China does not report inventories. Analysts are looking at overall supply (domestic production plus imports) and refinery processing rates to estimate how much crude is going into reserves and how much is being processed into fuels.
Using this calculation, Reuters’ Russell has estimated that China had 210,000 bpd of crude available to go to storage in July, considering total crude availability of 12.72 million bpd (8.41 million bpd of imports and 4.3 million bpd of domestic production), and refinery throughput of 12.51 million bpd.
The latest estimates show that China’s massive crude oil stockpile has mostly remained intact at about 1.2 billion barrels, five months after the worst disruption to global oil supply began with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
China slashed its overall crude oil imports amid the Middle East conflict as its refiners cut run rates and authorities restricted fuel exports to protect domestic supply.
Now China has eased some of the fuel export restrictions, which led to a rebound in crude oil imports in July, following a ten-year low seen in June.
The higher crude oil imports in July likely allowed stockpiling again, in a surprise to the market and possibly indicating continued weakness in domestic demand and refining volumes.
By Tsvetana Paraskova for Oilprice.com
By Irina Slav - Aug 17, 2026, 6:00 PM CDT
U.S. oil companies dominating the shale patch are planning to trim their spending plans and instead take advantage of higher international oil prices to reduce debt and boost shareholder returns. This is bad news for production growth.
Bloomberg reported earlier this month that all the big names in shale had reduced their spending over the first six months of the year. Chevron and ConocoPhillips spent 10% less in the period while Occidental slashed its spending on operations in the Permian by as much as a fifth over the first half of the year. Others, including APA Corp., HighPeak Energy, and Matador, are also spending less, the Bloomberg report also said.
The fact that Big Oil and independent shale majors are cutting spending to reward shareholders and pay down debt is not news. The industry has been following the path of fiscal discipline and shareholder return prioritization for years now. The fact that this path remains the one of choice for the majors means production growth in the world’s top producer may slow down in the coming months—while the world slips into a shortage.
The global oil market is about to slip into a deficit of 1.8 million barrels daily, the International Energy Agency said in its latest monthly Oil Market Report. U.S. crude oil production has been breaking records, reaching 13.714 million barrels daily in May, the latest data from the Energy Information Administration shows. Drilling rig numbers are on the rise, with the total 43 rigs higher than a year ago as of the second week of August.
However, with spending plans what they are, the rig addition rate may change. There is also the well depletion angle: shale wells notoriously deplete much faster than conventional wells, requiring a lot more frequent drilling and fracking. Speaking of well depletion, there have been warnings that shale wells were experiencing accelerated productivity decline rates.
Back in 2024, Enverus estimated that well productivity in the shale patch had declined by some 15%. Drillers compensated for this lower productivity by drilling longer laterals and making efficiency gains. That worked, too, but looking at the chart showing U.S. total oil production growth, one sees a slowdown in gains—even after the war between the United States and Israel and Iran began.
In the years between 2017 and 2020, oil production soared from 8.8 million barrels daily, as of December 2016, to 11.188 million barrels daily as of December 2020, according to data from the Energy Information Administration. This was a gain of almost 2.4 million barrels daily in four years, one of which years saw the sharpest, deepest demand destruction in history as countries locked down to contain the spread of Covid. Excluding this event, U.S. oil production hit 12.865 million barrels daily in January 2020. On this basis, total production growth between December 2016 and January 2020 stood at over 4 million barrels daily.
Between 2020 and May 2026, however, growth has slowed down to 2.5 million barrels daily, with production in the current year actually slightly lower than the average monthly for October 2025, for instance, which stood at 13.864 million barrels daily. The average for November 2025 was also higher than the latest monthly average, at 13.789 million barrels daily.
What this suggests is that U.S. shale oil producers are not, in fact, boosting production considerably in response to the crunch caused by the war in the Middle East. They are, based on the data, producing at consistent levels without making any sudden moves. Indeed, the Energy Information Administration has acknowledged the slowdown in its short-term forecasts. The agency expects this year’s average daily production at 13.8 million barrels, which would be a modest 200,000-bpd increase from a year ago.
That would be despite significantly higher oil prices prompted by a physical supply squeeze, no less—a scenario that normally triggers a boost in production. It would be despite the still murky prospect of peace between the belligerents in the Middle East, which means the supply squeeze is here to stay for a while—continued Hormuz blockage until the end of the year is no longer an outlandish scenario. If even that is not making shale majors drill more, it means there is a structural change in the industry.
This would come as no surprise to those who have been watching the shale patch for a while. The years of burning through cash and accumulating piles of debt just to see how much oil you could squeeze out of the shale rock are over, and they are not coming back. Discipline and shareholder returns are the name of the new game, and even the worst global oil crisis in history is not changing that, it seems. Of course, well depletion and productivity decline may well have a role to play in the industry’s agenda, too, and that role should not be underestimated.
https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/US-Shale-Majors-Cut-Spending-Despite-Higher-Oil-Prices.html
POSCO Future M plans to supply large volumes of LFP cathode material to an unnamed South Korean battery manufacturer starting in 2027. The agreement covers more than 190,000 metric tons over six years through 2032. The final contract terms are expected to be determined in the third quarter.
The agreement marks the company’s entry into the market for cathode materials used in lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries. According to POSCO Future M, the move is primarily driven by growing demand for stationary energy storage systems (ESS) in North America.
LFP Production in Pohang Set to Begin in 2026
To enable production in the near term, POSCO Future M has converted parts of existing production lines at its Pohang plant. These lines previously produced high-nickel cathode materials. The converted facilities will instead manufacture LFP cathode material.
According to the company, customer certification of prototypes is currently underway. Commercial-scale deliveries are scheduled to begin by the end of 2026.
LFP batteries have lower power output than NCM and NCA cells. However, they are less expensive and designed for a longer service life. POSCO Future M sees potential applications particularly in stationary energy storage and lower-cost electric vehicles.
For production, the company plans to use iron oxide derived from steelmaking byproducts, among other materials. Lithium is also expected to come from salt lakes in Argentina.
Additional LFP Capacity Planned from 2027
Additional production capacity is also being developed in Pohang. CNP New Material Technology, a joint venture between POSCO Future M and FINO-CNGR, began construction of an LFP cathode material plant in May.
Commercial production at the facility is scheduled to start in 2027. Capacity is expected to be expanded in stages to a maximum of 50,000 metric tons.
Source: https://www.poscofuturem.com/en/pr/view.do?num=1039
https://battery-news.de/en/2026/08/17/posco-future-m-enters-lfp-market-with-major-supply-deal/
Food waste recycling is being rolled out to almost 12,700 additional homes across Cambridge and South Cambridgeshire from next week (Monday 24 August).
The households, stretching from Bar Hill to Trumpington and across many other communities, bring the total number of homes receiving the service to more than 60,500.
Since its launch, the service has collected more than 2,800 tonnes of food waste which is being used to generate power and create biofertilizer.
This is the third wave of collections being rolled out by the Greater Cambridge Shared Waste Service (GCSW).
The Government’s introduction of Simpler Recycling legislation makes weekly collection of household food waste mandatory for all local authorities. GCSWS began deliveries of new silver pest-proof caddies in January 2026.
Cabinet Member for Climate Action and Environment at Cambridge City Council, Cllr Rosy Moore, said: “We’ve seen a really positive response to the new service, with most households using it every week. In particular, the scheme is working very well at flats, most of which have not had any way to recycle food waste before. I’m pleased those residents will now have more ways to make a difference through recycling.”
The collected food waste is taken to Anaerobic Digestion (AD) plants at Baldock. March and Thetford, where the biogas given off by the decomposing food is captured and used to generate power. When fully broken down the food becomes biofertilizer which can be spread on farmland. This process both reduces demand for oil and gas through providing a renewable alternative fuel while also reducing impact on the climate crisis by preventing the release of landfill gases including methane into the atmosphere.
Lead Cabinet Member for the Environment at South Cambridgeshire District Council, Cllr Laurence Damary-Homan, said: “You might think that you don’t create any food waste, but even things like teabags, banana peel and onion skins can be included, and it all adds up! In fact, recycling food waste is one of the most impactful actions you can do at home – one full caddy could power a TV for 2 hours.”
https://www.scambs.gov.uk/news/thousands-more-homes-to-receive-weekly-collections-of-food-waste
Ma’aden’s aluminium business was the standout performer in the Saudi mining giant’s latest financial results.
The segment delivered its best quarterly financial performance since inception as higher aluminium prices drove an increase in revenue and profitability.
Aluminium business revenue rose 49% year on year to about $1.01 billion in the second quarter, while EBITDA more than doubled to $411 million.
The division's EBITDA margin reached 41%, according to the company’s latest results, published last week.
The performance is particularly notable because production volumes were broadly stable rather than dramatically higher.
Ma’aden produced 242,000 tonnes of aluminium during the quarter, slightly below the year-earlier level.
The major earnings driver was pricing.
Ma’aden’s average realised aluminium price jumped 51% to $3,915 per tonne in the second quarter, supported by strong regional premiums.
The result also represents a substantial improvement from the first quarter, when the aluminium business reported EBITDA of approximately $269 million.
Ma’aden's aluminium operation extends beyond primary metal production. It also encompasses alumina and downstream activities including rolling products.
Ma’aden said aluminium prices began to moderate toward the end of the second quarter.
However, the company expects a global aluminium deficit of about 1.7 million tonnes for the remainder of 2026, which could provide continued support to prices in the near term.
The company described medium- to long-term aluminium market fundamentals as favourable.
https://aluminiumtoday.com/news/maadens-aluminium-business-delivers-record-quarter
Serbia’s Agency for Spatial Planning and Urban Planning has nine months to draft a spatial plan for the second development phase of the Jama Bor mine. The decision to draft the special purpose area spatial plan for the mine was published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, with the deadline starting to run from the day the decision takes effect.
The plan covers parts of three cadastral municipalities: Bor I, Bor II and Ostrelj. The stated goal is to create a planning basis for continuing development of the mining and metallurgical system and for increasing copper ore output. The investor is Serbia Zijin Copper, the company that runs Serbia’s only copper production, based in Bor.
The draft plan will go to public review for 30 days, at the Bor City Administration building.
What does the second development phase bring?
The decision lists three items:
A flotation plant is where mined ore gets ground and separated in a water bath into copper concentrate and tailings. In practice, it is the flotation plant’s capacity, not the pit’s, that sets the ceiling on how much ore the system can process in a year. The new flotation plant is therefore the only item on the list that directly raises that ceiling, while the other two concern access to the deposit and supporting facilities.
https://srpske.rs/en/news/ekonomija/2026/08/17/jama-bor-mine-second-phase-new-flotation-plant
The China Iron and Steel Association (CISA) released production data for member steel producers covering the first 10 days of August 2026.
According to the data, average daily crude steel production by CISA member producers stood at 1.97 million mt. Production increased by 109,000 mt/day, or 5.8%, compared with the final period of July, while remaining 4.9% lower than in the same period last year.
CISA stated that the increase in production was driven by several major steel producers completing maintenance work and resuming production during the first 10 days of August.
Crude steel production in North China increased by 12%
The highest increase in crude steel production during the first 10 days of August was recorded in North China.
Average daily crude steel production by CISA member producers in the region increased by 12%, or 69,000 mt, to 645,000 mt compared with the July 21-31 period.
The increase was driven by the restart of blast furnaces and sintering facilities following the end of production restrictions imposed in Tangshan from July 25 to 29.
China’s daily crude steel production estimated at 2.67 million mt
Based on CISA data, average daily crude steel production across China, including both member and non member producers, was estimated at 2.67 million mt during the first 10 days of August.
This figure represented an increase of 5.8% compared with the final period of July.
Finished steel production decreased by 8.2%
Average daily finished steel production by CISA member producers stood at 1.82 million mt during the same period. Production decreased by 163,000 mt/day, or 8.2%, compared with the final period of July.
CISA stated that the decline was partly due to the high comparison base in the final period of July. Even excluding this effect, average daily finished steel production remained 5.3% below the July 21-31 period.
Steelmakers’ inventories increased to 17.18 million mt
Despite the decline in production, finished steel inventories held by CISA member steel producers increased.
Inventories increased by 5.6%, or 910,000 mt, from July 31 to reach 17.18 million mt as of August 10.
Commercial finished steel inventories in 21 cities monitored by CISA also increased by 0.6%, or 60,000 mt, during the same period, reaching 9.86 million mt.
