President Trump's Iran policy has descended into open contradiction, with the White House simultaneously declaring an "immediate ceasefire" is imminent while threatening to seize Iranian territory and launch devastating strikes on Tehran's oil infrastructure.
The whiplash messaging reached its peak Thursday when Trump announced the United States would strike Iran "very hard" tonight and threatened to seize Kharg Island, Iran's critical oil export terminal, days after posting on Truth Social that Israel and Iran were "looking to do an immediate ceasefire."
"At some point in the not too distant future, we will be taking Kharg Island, and other oil infrastructure points, and assume total control of their oil and gas markets," Trump declared today, comparing the planned operation to Washington's takeover of Venezuela's energy sector.
During the same hour, he also said on Fox & Friends, "They're dying to make a deal. They want to make a deal so badly. We dropped $250 million of bombs on them last night. They're really in submission. They just don't know it yet."
https://www.jfeed.com/analysis/trump-iran-contradictory-strategy-deal-threats
THE EU’S 21st sanctions package against Russia arrives with familiar fanfare and familiar problems. Brussels insists its incremental approach is working; critics argue the bloc’s slow‑grind sanctions architecture creates more friction for global markets than for Moscow. Both views contain a sliver of truth.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was emphatic this week that sanctions are biting hard. She pointed to Russia’s exclusion from global capital markets, a sharply slowing economy, dwindling sovereign wealth reserves and a 40% collapse in energy revenues in early 2026. Export controls, she said, are starving Russia’s defence sector of critical components, while hundreds of shadow fleet tankers have been hit with restrictions.
But the geopolitical backdrop has shifted. The conflict in the Middle East and disruptions to global energy supply chains have eased pressure on Russia’s oil revenues. That is why the EU is now scrambling to preserve one of its most symbolic tools: the oil price cap.
The cap was designed to track market movements, not to withstand a shock on the scale of the Strait of Hormuz closure. Without intervention, the mechanism would automatically lift the cap to around $70 a barrel — hardly a squeeze on Moscow. Brussels’ solution is to freeze the adjustment until January, buying time for markets to stabilise while maintaining downward pressure on Russian profits. In theory, at least. Nobody is paying much attention to the price cap right now.
In reality, the EU had hoped to scrap the cap entirely and impose a full ban on maritime services. Washington’s lack of enthusiasm killed that plan, leaving the freeze as the only politically viable option. Even that requires unanimous backing from member states.
The rest of the package is thinner than previous rounds: another modest batch of shadow fleet tankers added to a list already exceeding 600 and expected restrictions on gas tanker sales that may prove as porous as earlier oil tanker measures. Notably absent are sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil, despite US action last year and Lukoil’s significant EU retail presence.
Where Brussels hoped for quieter diplomatic wins — particularly in persuading African states to stop flagging shadow fleet vessels — the results are mixed. Cameroon’s decision to purge 36 ships looks like progress, but most of its remaining fleet is still sanctioned, and vessels often simply migrate to other permissive registries.
For all the EU’s persistence, the pattern remains the same: incremental steps, limited impact and a sanctions regime still struggling to keep pace with the world it is trying to shape.
Richard Meade
Editor-in-chief, Lloyd’s List
https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1157435/The-Daily-View-A-familiar-pattern
Strait of Hormuz Disruptions Delay 500,000 bpd of Chinese Refining Capacity
Chinese oil processors have been compelled to push back or suspend indefinitely a total of 500,000 barrels per day of refining capacity due to interruptions in crude flows from the Middle East via the Strait of Hormuz, marking one of the earliest significant downstream effects of the Iran conflict outside the Gulf region, as reported by Reuters on Monday.
The setbacks involve a 300,000-bpd facility under construction by Huajin Aramco Petrochemical Co. in northeastern China and a planned 200,000-bpd restart at PetroChina's Dalian refinery. Both initiatives were anticipated to bolster China's refining expansion this year but have been deferred amid supply uncertainties and worsening refining margins.
According to Reuters, the Huajin refinery's startup has been postponed by several months, with Energy Aspects now forecasting operations to commence in the third quarter instead of the second. This project ranks among the largest refining ventures currently underway in China and is supported by Saudi Aramco, which is slated to provide up to 210,000 barrels per day of crude under a long-term supply arrangement.
PetroChina has indefinitely shelved plans to reactivate a 200,000-bpd crude processing unit at its Dalian refinery, Reuters noted, adding that the company has not officially acknowledged the delay. The unit was idled as part of a broader reorganization, with some sections previously expected to restart this year.
China's crude imports dropped to 6.36 million barrels per day in May from 11.39 million bpd in February, based on Kpler data cited by Reuters, representing a decline exceeding 44%. Yet refinery throughput stayed near 13.5 million bpd, meaning processors were handling more than double the volume of crude that the nation imported.
The shortfall has been primarily covered by stockpiles built up prior to the conflict. For over a year, Chinese buyers acquired discounted crude from Russia and Iran while amassing strategic and commercial reserves. Analysts estimate these inventories reached approximately 1 billion barrels before the war. China has persisted in expanding its crude storage capacity and was still constructing new facilities when hostilities began.
Kuwait has shipped a cargo of liquefied petroleum gas out of the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz using a tanker it controls, as more producers opt for clandestine tactics to get energy to markets.
The Gas Umm Al Rowaisat, owned by state-owned Kuwait Petroleum Corp.’s shipping arm, transited the strait before transferring the LPG cargo to another vessel that is currently heading for India’s Paradip port, according to traders, Kpler Ltd., and ship-tracking data compiled by Bloomberg. The tanker went dark after loading last month, reappearing near India on Sunday.
Major producers including the United Arab Emirates are increasingly switching off location transponders on tankers they control to export crude and liquefied natural gas through the strait. While shipments are well below pre-war levels, Rapidan Energy Group predicts around 2 million barrels of oil and related products are being ferried out of the Persian Gulf each day.
“With UAE-origin cargoes using this method successfully for the past few weeks, it doesn’t surprise me that others are following suit,” said Ciaran Tyler, a lead research analyst at Kpler. The UAE started using the tactic last month to ensure LPG shipments to key buyer India, Tyler said.
KPC didn’t respond to a request for comment. Kuwait also recently offered to sell its crude to refiners in Asia for the first time since the Iran war started, providing further evidence of flows getting out of the Gulf through Hormuz.
With its Automatic Identification System switched off, the Gas Umm Al Rowaisat loaded LPG on May 28 at Kuwait’s Mina Al Ahmadi refinery, according to Kpler, where KPC operates a gas processing plant. The vessel re-appeared on June 7 near Sikka along India’s northwest coast.
Gas Umm Al Rowaisat then transferred its cargo to KPC-chartered supertanker Badrinath by ship-to-ship transfer, according to traders, ship-tracking data and Kpler. The vessel is currently signaling Paradip.
India is a key buyer of LPG and relied heavily on Persian Gulf producers for the product used primarily as a cooking gas in the Asian nation. The country has been forced to hike prices twice since the war cut off supplies.
KEY POINTS
The U.S. has emerged as the top supplier of liquefied natural gas and liquefied petroleum gas to India in May, as shipments from the Gulf countries fell due to traffic disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.
India imports 60% of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) and almost all liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) supplies through the critical waterway, which has been disrupted since the U.S. and Israel first struck Iran on Feb. 28.
Washington supplied 630,000 tonnes of LPG to India in May, roughly 60% more than the 380,000 tonnes the country received from all the Gulf countries put together, as per data from Kpler.
The U.S exported 900,000 tonnes of LNG to India in May, which accounted for more than 40% of India's total requirement and was a threefold increase on April, Kpler said.
Experts said that the conflict in the Middle East boosted U.S. exports, but added that the rise was also driven by Washington's broader push to sell India more American energy. Even before the start of the war, the two countries were deepening their energy trade.
"Going forward, the India–US energy trade will increasingly focus on gas," Sumit Ritolia, lead research analyst at energy intelligence firm Kpler, told CNBC.
The U.S., with its "abundant shale resources and expanding export infrastructure," is uniquely positioned to benefit from India's need to diversify gas supplies, he added.
https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/11/us-india-lng-lpg-supply.html
By Cyril Widdershoven - Jun 11, 2026, 5:00 PM CDT
Iraq’s oil sector has been discussed over the last few years primarily through the lens of production figures, OPEC quotas and reserve estimates. The latter, however, is no longer sufficient or even appropriate, as today’s story is no longer only oil. The current focus should be on a struggle over sovereignty, state authority, regional geopolitics and economic survival.
The coming months will prove decisive for the future of Iraq’s hydrocarbon sector. The government in Baghdad is currently attempting to rebuild and centralize an energy industry that has been fragmented for decades by war, corruption, militia influence, regional rivalries and institutional weakness. Iraq, at the same time, will need to get out of the ongoing conflict between an assertive Iran, increasingly independent Kurdish ambitions, and mounting pressure from international energy markets.
The irony is striking. The Middle East giant still holds some of the world's largest oil and gas reserves, but its energy future will be determined not by geology but by politics.
Iraq’s Ministry of Oil has become the centerpiece of Baghdad’s broader state-building project. Since early 2026, federal authorities have accelerated efforts to centralize control over exports, revenues and infrastructure. After the elections, a new leadership has been appointed. The increasing role of SOMO and federal institutions already indicates a clear objective: to reduce fragmentation and restore Baghdad's authority over the entire hydrocarbon sector. The new Iraqi leadership has become aware that continued political fragmentation translates directly into lost revenues and reduced strategic influence.
The Hormuz crisis has only amplified the urgency of these reforms, as the country is among the hardest hit by disruptions to Gulf energy exports. Before the regional conflict, Baghdad exported around 93 million barrels per month through the Strait of Hormuz. By April 2026, however, these exports through the Strait had declined to around 10 million barrels. Again, even if some don’t want to see it, this has exposed the extraordinary vulnerability of Iraq’s export system. Insurance costs, security concerns, and tanker shortages created an economic shock that Baghdad could not ignore.
For the first time in years, Baghdad’s policymakers are forced to confront a reality that energy analysts have highlighted for decades. The country cannot continue relying almost exclusively on southern export terminals connected to a single geopolitical chokepoint.
This new realization, or maybe even the first-time realism back in town, is the main factor behind the resumption of exports through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline has become so strategically important. The March 2026 agreement between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was not simply an export deal. Without a doubt, Iraq's energy security depends on cooperation between Erbil and Baghdad, which the Iraqi government now acknowledges. Exports through Ceyhan have resumed at around 200,000-250,000 bpd, with ambitions to increase substantially in the coming months. Joint committees have been established, revenues are again flowing into federal structures, and both sides recognize the strategic necessity of keeping northern export routes operational.
Still, there should not be real optimism yet, as this would be a major mistake; it is only a tactical cooperation, not yet a strategic reconciliation.
The relationship between Baghdad and Erbil remains fundamentally fragile. The KRG continues to demand guarantees on budget transfers, salary payments, trade restrictions and investor protections. All Kurdish leaders have repeatedly argued that security threats from militia groups operating near energy infrastructure will have to be addressed and fully removed before long-term confidence can return. Iraqi authorities, however, still insist that all hydrocarbon revenues ultimately belong to the Iraqi state.
Despite these tensions, there are reasons for cautious optimism.
The Hormuz crisis has created a rare alignment of interests: Baghdad needs northern export routes, while the KRG needs revenue. International oil companies need predictability. Turkey wants transit volumes restored. Washington supports closer federal-KRG cooperation. For perhaps the first time in years, all major stakeholders benefit from a functioning export framework. This also applies to natural gas projects.
For decades, Iraq has been one of the world's great paradoxes: a major energy producer that continues to import gas and electricity. Associated gas flaring remains enormous, while domestic demand continues to rise. Due to the changing geopolitical and security situation in the region, Baghdad now sees gas development as both an economic necessity and a geopolitical imperative. Clearly, every cubic meter of domestically produced gas will reduce Iraq’s dependence on Iranian imports and strengthen the country’s energy security.
This is where the Kurdish region may become a critical part of Iraq's future.
The KRG possesses significant untapped gas resources capable of supporting domestic Iraqi demand, industrial development, and, potentially, future exports to Turkey and Europe. European and other Western policymakers are increasingly viewing Kurdish gas development as a means of reducing Iraqi dependence on Iran. At the same time, it will also support Europe’s move to quit its dependence on Russian and other external suppliers. The strategic importance of Kurdish gas has therefore risen substantially over the last two years.
While all of this is clear, it still does not separate it from the Iranian factor.
Iran remains the single most important external influence on Iraq's political and energy landscape. The Iranian Iraqi relationship is deeply embedded through trade, electricity imports, religious networks, political parties and security structures. The last sanctions on Iraqi officials and allegations involving Iranian-linked oil networks have again highlighted how difficult it remains to separate Iraqi energy policy from broader regional geopolitics. Baghdad’s main challenge is not simply Iranian influence; it is the role of Iran-linked militias operating inside the country.
The new Iraqi leadership has pledged to strengthen state authority and bring weapons under government control. Some militia groups have signaled a willingness to cooperate with reform efforts, while others remain deeply entrenched inside political, security and economic structures. Emerging optimism about signs that certain factions explore separation from formal militia frameworks should be tempered, as institutional influence built over two decades cannot be dismantled overnight.
For international investors, Western but also others, this situation or critical position remains the single greatest concern.
International oil companies can manage geological risks or price volatility. IOCs and NOCs can even manage regulatory uncertainty. The main issue they are unable to deal with is the risk of missile attacks, militia interference, political intimidation and infrastructure disruption. For Iraq, the coming weeks (or months) will represent a critical test.
If Baghdad succeeds in gradually strengthening state authority while avoiding confrontation with militia actors, investor confidence can improve. If tensions between Washington and Tehran escalate again, as they seem to be doing at present, Iraq is clearly expected once more to be one of the preferred arenas for proxy competition. Under such circumstances, pipelines, oil fields, export terminals and foreign-operated facilities would inevitably become targets.
At the same time, the broader regional environment adds another layer of complexity. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has changed Iraqi strategic thinking. Even as regional tensions ease, policymakers now understand that the old model is no longer viable. Baghdad is and will need to actively explore alternative export routes, pipeline expansions, and new agreements with Turkey. Discussions involving international energy companies, including major American firms, demonstrate Iraq's ambition to increase production capacity toward 5 million bpd while simultaneously expanding gas development.
Again, however, strategies and political wishful thinking will be confronted by a list of obstacles that must be addressed. The existing Iraq-Turkey pipeline framework faces uncertainty as long-standing agreements approach expiration. At the same time, infrastructure investment needs will be massive, totaling several billion dollars. Security concerns remain significant for a longer period. Yet the direction of travel is increasingly clear: Iraq is seeking diversification, redundancy and greater strategic autonomy.
This is where the story could become more optimistic than many observers assume.
For years, Iraq's energy narrative has been dominated by crises. ISIS. Budget disputes. Oil price collapses. Iranian influence. Militia violence. Pipeline shutdowns and political paralysis. At present, however, maybe for the first time in a decade, there are signs that structural incentives are aligning in favor of reform.
Baghdad recognizes the necessity of stronger institutions, including a functioning security system. At the same time, the KRG recognizes the necessity of cooperation. International investors recognize the scale of the opportunity. Turkey recognizes the value of Iraqi exports. Even regional actors increasingly understand that a stable Iraqi energy sector benefits everyone. The potential prize is enormous.
Even with the Middle East's vast potential, Iraq remains one of the few countries capable of materially increasing global oil production over the next decade. The country’s gas reserves are still underdeveloped, while its petrochemical sector offers substantial growth opportunities. Geography here also plays a significant role, as its location serves as a bridge among the Gulf, Turkey, Europe, and the Eastern Mediterranean.
For the Kurdish region, the outlook is equally promising if political agreements can be sustained. The combination of oil exports, gas development, proximity to Turkey and growing international interest in energy diversification could transform the KRG from a perpetual political problem into one of Iraq's most important economic assets.
Optimism could be right, but reality is still hard to deal with. Iranian influence, even if the current regime in Tehran is weakened, will remain. Iraqi Shia militias will not disappear overnight, while the Baghdad-Erbil disputes are not solved yet. Regional instability will periodically return, even in case of a US-Iran deal or a change of regime in Tehran.
Yet the most important development is that Iraq's leadership is finally beginning to address the structural weaknesses that have constrained the sector for decades. The next crisis in Tehran, Washington or Erbil will not determine the future of Iraq’s oil and gas industry. When addressed rightly, it will be determined by whether Iraq can build institutions stronger than the political forces that have historically divided it.
A South Korean joint venture including battery material and chemicals group Posco Future M has broken ground for an LFP cathode materials plant in the country targeting the ESS and EV batteries market.
CNP New Material Technology, backed by Posco, secondary batteries firm Pino and battery materials producer CNGR, started building the facility “in earnest” on May 28 ― with production set to start next year.
Posco said the Pohang facility will ramp up production to an annual capacity of 50,000 tonnes.
Separately, Posco is itself converting part of an existing three-element high-nickel production line at its Pohang cathode material plant into an LFP cathode material production line.
Prototype production will begin soon and mass production is planned from the second half of this year, giving Posco an early entry into the LFP cathode material business, the group said.
While LFP batteries have lower output compared to ternary batteries such as NCM and NCA, they have an advantage in terms of low price and long lifespan, Posco said.
However, the group plans to market LFP products alongside its current main ternary products such as NCM and NCA batteries.
Posco said an expansion of renewable energy and spread of AI-based data centres in South Korea and globally have led to increased power needs, leading to a rapid rise in demand for LFP batteries for ESS, and the use of LFP batteries is also expanding in the EV market, especially in entry-level vehicles.
North America and Europe are seen as key overseas markets for LFP batteries from the joint venture as those regions look to secure supply chains.
Batteries International reported last year that South Korea had scrambled to shore up the country’s battery sector with an initial cash infusion worth close to $15 billion, as a global slump in EV sales took its toll on the industry.
Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy said on January 15 the KRW21 trillion jump-start was needed to ensure Korean battery production for EVs and energy storage systems could remain competitive at home and abroad.
BYD’s Flash Chargers can deliver up to 1,500 kilowatts of power to cars fitted with its latest Blade Battery.
Photo by: BYD 
By: Iulian Dnistran Jun 11, at 4:14am
BYD, the Chinese company that has set its sights on becoming the world’s largest automaker, wants to blanket Europe with thousands of its megawatt-capable EV chargers in the next few years.
The carmaker said it wants to build no fewer than 3,000 of its latest Flash Chargers across the continent by 2027. As a reminder, BYD’s dual DC fast chargers can deliver up to 1,500 kilowatts—that’s 1.5 megawatts—of power, but not all cars can accept such a high input.
All EVs fitted with a CCS2 charge port will be able to recharge at BYD’s European Flash Chargers, but only cars powered by the Chinese company’s latest-generation Blade Battery will be able to take full advantage of the immensely powerful dispensers. So far, though, there’s just one car sold in Europe that can rise up to the challenge, the $133,000 (€115,000) Denza Z9GT, which can go from 10-to-70% state of charge in just five minutes.
In the grand scheme of things, BYD is still a relatively small player in the European EV charging game. By comparison, Tesla has over 20,000 DC fast chargers providing energy to European EV drivers, but the Superchargers are nowhere near as powerful as BYD’s newest dispensers. The latest Supercharger V4, for example, which is still quite rare, can deliver up to 500 kW, while the older V3 stalls are capped at 250 kW.
All this being said, BYD is just starting out in this part of the world. After Europe, the Chinese company is planning to expand its ultra-fast charging network to Canada. According to a recent LinkedIn job posting that surfaced on Reddit, BYD is currently looking for a Business Development Manager who can start work on deploying the Flash Charging network in Canada.
There’s no word on when the first dispenser will become operational, but it’s probably sooner rather than later, seeing how the automaker is looking to get a foothold in the Canadian market after the government slashed import fees and imposed a 49,000-vehicle quota for Chinese-built cars this year.
Getting back to Europe, the first Flash Chargers are already online in Germany and the United Kingdom, with thousands to follow in just a few years.
https://insideevs.com/news/798421/byd-5-minute-ev-chargers-europe-canada/
“We don’t need anything that Canada has, we don’t need anything that Mexico has, but they need everything that we have,” Trump said, pointing to cars, lumber and energy. “And they should have to treat us better.”
Canada and Mexico have both called for a 16-year extension of CUSMA. If the Trump administration blows past the July deadline, the trade pact stays in place subject to an annual rolling review for up to 10 years.
While the president could also give six months’ notice that the United States is pulling out of the agreement, comments from members of the Trump administration, including Hoekstra, indicate that’s not likely to happen immediately.
Hoekstra said Canadians may not like the way Trump says things but Canada has an opportunity to go into the negotiations “very aggressively and say, ‘We know America has needs across the board and we’re here to partner with America and fill those needs because we are the best place for America to fill these needs.'”
Pointing to Canadian potash, Hoekstra said there aren’t a lot of other places the United States can get the key ingredient for fertilizer. More than 80 per cent of the United States’ potash imports come from Canada; the alternative global suppliers are Russia and Belarus.
Hoekstra said it’s also more desirable for the United States to get resources like oil from Alberta and automobiles from Ontario.
He said the U.S. can get automobiles from other countries but Ottawa makes a compelling case that “the best place to get that car from is Canada” because of similar labour forces, work and environmental standards, similar pay scales and a long-standing integrated industry.
“Make us an offer,” Hoekstra said.
CUSMA was negotiated during the first Trump administration to replace the North American Free Trade Agreement but the president has since called it “irrelevant.”
The trade agreement has shielded Canada and Mexico from many of Trump’s tariffs. The current 10 per cent global tariff does not apply to goods that are compliant under CUSMA.
Canada and Mexico are still being slammed by Trump’s separate tariffs on sectors like steel, aluminum and automobiles.
This report by The Canadian Press was first published June 11, 2026.
Kelly Geraldine Malone, The Canadian Press
Africa's largest copper mining complex has completed a major milestone in its push to establish a new export pathway to global markets, with copper shipped through the Lobito Corridor successfully arriving in Europe for refining.
Africa's largest copper mining complex launches Europe-bound trade route with first Lobito Corridor shipment
Ivanhoe Mines announced that copper anodes from the Kamoa-Kakula Copper Complex in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) recently reached the Aurubis refinery in Belgium, where they were refined into more than 99.99% pure London Metal Exchange (LME) Grade A copper cathodes.
The update builds on an earlier milestone when Kamoa-Kakula became one of the first major mining operations to export copper through the Lobito Corridor, a rail network connecting the DRC Copperbelt to Angola's Atlantic coast.
At the time, the shipment was viewed as a key test of the corridor's ability to provide an alternative route for Central African minerals to reach global markets.
From corridor test to European delivery
The latest development confirms that the shipment has successfully completed its journey from the DRC to Europe, demonstrating the viability of a new mine-to-market export route for one of the world's most important copper-producing regions.
According to Ivanhoe Mines, the copper was processed, smelted and refined using largely renewable energy sources, creating what the company describes as one of the world's lowest carbon-intensive refined copper supply chains.
The achievement comes as global demand for copper continues to surge, driven by electric vehicles, renewable energy projects, battery storage systems and grid expansion.
Why the Lobito Corridor matters
The Lobito Corridor has emerged as one of Africa's most strategically important infrastructure projects.
Linking mining regions in the DRC and Zambia to Angola's Port of Lobito, the route offers a faster alternative to traditional export corridors that often rely on longer road and rail networks through southern Africa.
Backed by investments from the United States, the European Union, Angola, Zambia and the DRC, the corridor is increasingly viewed as a critical channel for transporting minerals essential to the global energy transition, including copper and cobalt.
For the DRC, the successful delivery highlights the country's growing role in global supply chains beyond raw mineral extraction. It also demonstrates how improved transport infrastructure can help unlock greater value from Africa's vast mineral resources.
Ivanhoe's expanding influence in African mining
The milestone further reinforces Ivanhoe Mines' position as one of the continent's most influential mining companies. Through Kamoa-Kakula, the company operates one of the world's highest-grade and fastest-growing copper complexes.
Beyond copper, Ivanhoe controls the Kipushi zinc mine in the DRC and the Platreef platinum-group metals project in South Africa, giving it exposure to several of the critical minerals expected to underpin the global energy transition.
According to Indian officials, steel production volumes should be assessed in relation to the size of the population
India does not have excess production capacity in the textile and steel industries, despite claims made in the US Trade Representative’s (USTR) Section 301 investigation. Washington had previously claimed that there was structural overcapacity in Indian industry — ranging from solar modules to textiles — and highlighted India’s trade surplus with the US, which stood at $42 billion in 2025. This was reported by Reuters.
India’s Additional Secretary for Trade, Amitabh Kumar, noted that textile and steel production volumes should be assessed in light of population size, domestic demand and the country’s growth needs, rather than in absolute terms. He emphasised that per capita consumption of textiles (particularly synthetic fibres) and steel in India remains among the lowest in the world. Therefore, current steel production volumes merely meet the country’s development needs.
According to global trade analysts, Washington is using the threat of Section 301 tariffs to force New Delhi to open its markets to American agricultural products, as well as to increase purchases of energy resources and defence goods from the US.
The US is currently considering several leverage points:
1) Tariffs over forced labour. This month, the US proposed an additional 12.5% tariff on imports from India and other countries over the alleged use of forced labour. The Indian side noted that this decision is not final, as negotiations are ongoing.
2) Tariffs over excess capacity. The USTR is exploring the possibility of imposing a separate tariff, arguing that Indian textile exports are harming the US industry.
New Delhi is seeking to conclude a trade agreement with the US to secure preferential tariffs compared to its competitors, but negotiations are being complicated by US investigations. These were launched in March against 16 countries over subsidies and state funding that allow factories to operate contrary to market conditions.
Despite the differences, India’s Trade Minister Piyush Goyal has stated that both sides are making rapid progress towards finalising the first part of the trade agreement, which could be agreed as early as mid-July.
It should be noted that India’s National Steel Policy 2025 sets a target to expand steel production capacity to 400 million tonnes by the 2035/2036 financial year. To achieve this, the country will require capital investment of $183 billion. According to India’s Ministry of Steel, steel production in the country for the 2025/2026 financial year (ending 31 March) is estimated at 168.4 million tonnes (+10.7% year-on-year).
https://gmk.center/en/news/india-rejects-us-allegations-of-excess-steel-production-capacity/
Baosteel Keeps July Flat Steel Prices Unchanged, Raises Electrical Steel by 300 Yuan/t
Baoshan Iron & Steel, which operates under the world's largest steelmaker China Baowu Steel Group, has opted to hold steady the prices for the majority of its flat steel offerings, such as hot-rolled coil, for July domestic sales. MySteel reported this based on the firm's official statement.
The sole deviation involves grain-oriented electrical steel, where the company implemented a further price hike of 300 yuan per metric ton, or $44.3 per ton. Before this move, Baosteel had already raised costs for hot-rolled coils, heavy plate, and various other items over four straight months.
Currently, domestic steel demand in China remains weak, while Southeast Asian regional markets are also facing a summer downturn marked by rainy conditions and elevated temperatures.
It is worth noting that the worldwide hot-rolled coil market displayed divergent patterns in April 2026. In the United States and China, prices kept climbing because of constrained supply and costly raw materials. Meanwhile, the European Union's domestic sector stayed under strain from tepid demand amid increasing import expenses.
As noted by GMK Center, on 8 June, US steelmaker Nucor once more boosted its hot-rolled coil spot price by $10 per short ton relative to the prior week, reaching $1,115 per ton. The firm has been steadily ramping up its supply of this product since January.
